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Abstract 
In this paper, which forms a chapter in the forthcoming Book “Delivering a Low Carbon 
Electricity System: Technologies, Economics and Policy”2, Grubb and Newbery examine 
how carbon for electricity generation should be priced. They begin by suggesting that it is not 
clear what the correct price of carbon is, but that it spans the whole range of economically 
plausible prices. They then go on to discuss the theoretical merits of taxes versus quotas, 
concluding that theoretically a stable tax would best reflect the true social cost of emissions, 
which should not change with market conditions. They then go to evaluate the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme where allowances for the emission of CO2 are traded (EUAs). The price 
signals offered by the scheme in its first trading period have been very unsatisfactory with 
high variability and the price trending down towards very low levels as it has become clear 
that governments were much too generous in their initial allocation of quotas. What is needed 
is a stable investment environment for low carbon generation investments. They discuss a 
number of policy options to achieve this: long period commitments on quotas; allowing 
unconstrained banking and borrowing of EUAs over multiple periods; long term price 
declarations to be used in allocation auctions; government issued contracts for differences on 
the future carbon price; or simply to issue low-carbon electricity contracts. The authors 
conclude with a discussion of the scope for international agreements on carbon emissions 
reduction. They conclude that imperfect though it is the EU ETS is a good place to start to 
link up emerging trading regimes, and that quota systems have more of a chance of 
commanding international agreement at least initially. However any international climate 
change agreement will be difficult to establish. 
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1 Introduction 
The UK Energy Review states that “The only way in which the international community will 
limit the rise in carbon emissions is if governments, industry and individuals take into account 
the costs associated with the emissions for which they are responsible. … A carbon price is 
essential for making lower carbon emissions a business imperative. … Establishing a price for 
carbon is best done internationally because climate change is a global problem requiring 
collective action.” (DTI, 2006, p27). “Policy to reduce emissions should be based on three 
essential elements: carbon pricing, technology policy, and removal of barriers to behavioural 
change.” (The Stern Review, Stern, 2006).  The UK Government’s approach to climate change 
is thus based on sound economics. Chapter 2, in discussing the ‘Social Cost of Carbon’, has 
by implication discussed the level of carbon pricing that could be sought.  This chapter 
addresses the instruments that might deliver such carbon pricing and the challenges in seeking 
to internationalise such instruments.  Other chapters address instruments for energy 
efficiency, and for innovation. 
 
2 The social cost of carbon, carbon pricing and power sector mitigation 
From an economic perspective, the most fundamental single step in climate policy is to 
establish a price for carbon. This should be informed by (but is not the same thing as) the 
social cost of carbon – the present discounted value of the additional social costs (or the 
marginal social damage) that an extra tonne of carbon released now would impose on the 
current and future society.  As described in chapter 2, the Stern Review uses the PAGE2002 
model to calculate the likely damage caused by emitting an extra tonne of carbon and then to 
determine the resulting social cost of this damage, the social cost of carbon, SCC. We 
emphasise again that this measure of damage is not just a prediction of the economic impact 
of climate change, but an ethical valuation of its significance to society. As chapter 2 stressed, 
estimating the SCC is a multi-stage process.  
The first two stages are to estimate the effect of greenhouse gases (GHGs) on temperature, 
and then the effects of this temperature rise on climate (regionally, seasonally, probability of 
extreme events, sea-level rises, etc.). After these two climate-science driven steps, integrated 
assessment models (like PAGE) attempt to estimate the regional impacts of this climate 
change on well-being. If our economic modelling were as good as the climate science, we 
would then have a quantified description of the various economic effects, but over the long 
periods of time involved it would be foolish to pretend to any accuracy.  
In addition to the cascade of uncertainties set out in Chapter 2, the result does depend on the 
rate of technical progress (which influences economic and emission growth rates, the capacity 
to adapt to climate change, and the cost of mitigation). A typical prediction of the rate of 
technical progress is to assume that it will continue as in the past century (when it has been 
historically most unusually high). We have little other idea of the nature of future technology 
and hence the future standards of living, but the rate of technical progress will be a key 
determinant.  
The final step is to value these impacts when and where they occur and discount them to an 
equivalent present global aggregate. The valuation is one of the most controversial steps in 
the calculation. The PAGE model (and many other models) uses equity weighting, as 
discussed in chapter 2. The preferred weights are inversely proportional to per capita 
consumption (often proxied by GDP/head at purchasing power parity, $PPP). This has the 
ethically agreeable implication that if each country’s value of a statistical life is proportional 
to GDP/head, then climate damage that involves loss of life or life expectancy when weighted 
with these equity weights treats a year of life lost in Bangladesh as equal to that in the US or 
UK. Another way to appreciate the force of Stern’s assumption is that the social cost of 
reducing the consumption of a person in a rich country by 10% is valued equal to the social 
benefit of increasing the consumption of a person in a poor country by 10% now. Thus as 
Western Europe has 25 times the per capita consumption of Sub Saharan Africa (at 
Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates), incurring a cost of $25 in Western Europe to deliver 
a benefit of more than $1 in SSA would deliver a net social gain on this calculus. The 
implications of this for the choice of policy instruments are discussed below. 
The Stern Review adopts this approach, and also assumes a single view on the pure rate of 
time preference (PRTP, taken as 0.1% p.a.). Given these, and updating the IPCC ’s 2001 
Third Assessment Report to take account of stronger feedbacks and higher climate sensitivity, 
the Stern Review estimates the SCC as $312/tC (tonne of carbon, = $85/tonne CO2, $2006 
prices) if we remain on the Business as Usual (BAU) path (Stern, 2006, pxvi, p287), although 
this estimate is given with considerable hesitation: “We would therefore point to numbers for 
the ‘business as usual’ social cost of carbon well above (perhaps a factor of three times) the 
Tol mean of $29/tCO2 and the ‘lower central’ estimate of around $13/tCO2 in the recent study 
for DEFRA (Watkiss et al. (2005))… Nevertheless, we are keenly aware of the sensitivity of 
estimates to the assumptions that are made. Closer examination of this issue – and a 
narrowing of the range of estimates, if possible – is a high priority for research.” (Stern, 2006, 
p287).1  
The PAGE estimates presented in chapter 2 suggest a mean SCC of $(2000) 43/tC 
($11.7/tCO2), for a range of possible baseline scenarios (Hope, 2007a), with a 5-95% range of 
$10 to $130/tC ($2.7 to 35.5/tCO2).2 The central figure increases to $90/tC ($24.5/tCO2) (5-
                                                 
1  Box 13.1 of the Stern Review summarises other estimates of the SCC, citing a study by Downing et 
al (2005) for DEFRA, which observed that estimates in the literature range from £0-1000/tC, and 
suggested a lower benchmark of £35/tC ($12.5/tCO2) (all at 2000 prices). Tol’s (2005) survey found a 
median value of $14/tC ($3.8/tCO2)and the 95th percentile at $350/tC ($95.5/tCO2), comparable to that 
of the Stern Review (Stern, 2006, p288). 
2  As explained in chapter 1, the baseline scenarios assume no effective climate change mitigation, 
although different possible evolutions of emissions, so that eventually damaging climate change will 
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95% range $10–220/tC ($2.7-60/tCO2)) under updated estimates of climate sensitivity and 
other adjustments described in chapter 2. These estimates assume equity weights centred on 
the inverse of per capita consumption but with a range either side, and an average 
consumption rate of interest of 2 +/- 1%. If the rate of pure time preference is reduced (as in 
the Stern Review) to 0.1% - equivalent to setting a consumption rate of interest of about 1.5% 
- the model computes a mean SCC of $330/tC ($90/tCO2) (5-95% range $65 – 870/tC 
($17.7-237.3/tCO2)), essentially the same as the Stern Review. Ignoring equity weighting 
altogether, but taking a consumption rate of interest of 3+/-1%, the SCC is $51/tC 
($13.9/tCO2) (5-95% range $10 to $150/tC ($2.7 to 40.9/tCO2)). As such it is comparable to 
those derived from other models using the same consumption rate of interest. 
These estimates of the SCC and of the cost of climate change more generally, and the 
assumptions from which they flow, have attracted a great deal of economic discussion, as 
discussed in chapter 2. High values of the SCC can be defended either by assuming that we 
are willing to express significant social concern for distant future generations (low rate of 
pure time preference), or by assuming that the implied actions now, which are costly but not 
that costly (1-2% of GDP) should be considered as an insurance premium for a possibly very 
low (but essentially unknown) chance of very serious future damage. By definition, 
unpredictable events are impossible to model with any confidence, and the high SCC is 
warning us to take adequate steps now to reduce the risks of extreme, if unlikely, future 
disaster. 
The SCC could be interpreted as the correct price to set for emissions of carbon if the world 
were to collectively agree to the associated system of equity weights and rate of pure time 
preference. Even then, as chapter 2 indicated, the SCC depends on whose consumption is 
taken as numeraire. As reported, the numeraire (as in the Stern Review) is world average 
GDP/head at $PPP, but the SCC would be much higher if EU GDP/head were the numeraire, 
and very much lower if Sub-Saharan African GDP/head were used instead. The world average 
makes sense if there were a world government allocating resources for the benefit of all, but 
we are a long way from that state. The PAGE SCC without equity weighting is somewhat 
more than half the equity weighted value, and might represent a consensus view in which 
each country worries about the cash value of its own damage, but collectively recognises the 
public good nature of mitigation. This is more likely if the costs of mitigation are proportional 
to GDP (as is likely in the electricity sector), since future damage is also likely to be 
proportional to GDP, and if anything larger in poorer countries, encouraging their co-
operation. On the insurance argument, though, the main point is that the price of carbon 
should be high to induce sufficient mitigation, regardless of the fine balancing of current cost 
for expected future gain. 
To maximise global efficiency – and if international transfers (or allocations of carbon 
allowances) can address equity issues - the carbon price should be the same everywhere. 
                                                                                                                                                        
be unavoidable. In contrast, if we were to model a successful climate change mitigation strategy, then 
disaster would be averted and the SCC could be considerably lower. 
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Clearly in practice, any such global price of carbon would have emerge from negotiations, 
and would have to be a market price, not an equity weighted social value of the kind used in 
(typically national) social cost-benefit analysis (e.g. as in HMT 2003). Given all the 
considerations noted above, it is hard to predict what price might emerge from such 
negotiations, and the range of potentially defensible outcomes is clearly very wide.  
In terms of its implications for electricity policy, the most significant thing is that the range of 
potentially defensible SCCs spans almost the entire range of possible relevance to the 
economics of power generation. Chapter 3 summarised the implicit additional cost of the 
main low carbon power sources available to the UK.  The results are consistent with the IPCC 
conclusions that many large-scale options (e.g. nuclear, CCS, offshore wind and most 
biomass) would become economic at carbon prices in the range $20-50/tCO2 ($75-185/tC), if 
and as they were to be deployed at scale. The Stern Review’s estimate of SCC is comfortably 
above the upper end. The Tol mean is towards the low part of this range.  The PAGE results 
in Chapter 2 easily span the range and the 5-95% estimates go far beyond at both ends. In 
other words, plausibly defensible estimates of the SCC, applied as carbon prices, could imply 
anything ranging from a marginal additional cost insufficient to help most low carbon power 
sources, to a huge carbon charge sufficient for such sources to unambiguously dominate 
power investment.  
Given that investment decisions need to be made, and that neither further analysis nor global 
negotiations are likely to resolve the uncertainties quickly, a need for forward-looking 
judgement is inescapable. In this context, Figure 1 frames the cost-benefit economics of 
carbon pricing decisions.  As prices increase roughly over the range indicated, there may be 
quite a rapid increase in the degree of abatement in response, particularly as investment 
decisions start to switch away from coal towards low-carbon sources.  Above a certain price 
however, most zero-carbon sources may be exhausted (or may be facing hard constraints on 
siting or rates of expansion), so additional abatement may be very limited, at costs that could 
anyway only be justified if the SCC were at the higher levels of estimation. In the context of 
such uncertainties, in other words, a rational mitigation goal would be for a price/quantity 
outcome somewhere around the ‘point of inflexion’ in the supply curve - in the circle 
indicated in the Figure that could minimise ‘the cost of being wrong’. The circle itself spans a 
significant range.  Where to aim is not just a matter of making a best estimate applicable – it 
also needs to consider the role the UK wishes to take in the global process (discussed below), 
and the dynamic implications of the related decisions.  
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Figure 1: Plausible abatement marginal cost and benefit schedules3
 
3 Taxes or quotas? 
 
3.1 Theoretical fundamentals  
A price for carbon can be established directly either using a carbon tax, or by setting a 
quantity limit and letting companies trade the resulting emission allowances.  The EU 
approach is to issue EU Emission Allowances (EUA), each for 1 tonne of CO2, while in the 
past various countries, starting particularly in Scandinavia in the early 1990s, have imposed 
carbon taxes on fuels (with exemptions for internationally exposed industries). If there is 
complete information and no uncertainty, the efficient level could be achieved either by 
issuing the correct number of quotas or setting the pollution tax at the marginal damage cost 
at the efficient level. This equality of outcome breaks down under uncertainty or with 
asymmetric information. Weitzman (1974) started a lengthy debate by observing that in the 
presence of uncertainty, quotas are only superior to taxes if the marginal benefit from 
abatement schedule (i.e. the marginal damage of emissions) is steeper than the marginal cost 
                                                 
3 The Figure illustrates schematically the cost-benefit tradeoff in the face of uncertainty and convexity.  
The ‘cost of climate damage’ declines as the degree of abatement (x-axis) increases, but is highly 
uncertain (as indicated by the wide vertical range - that is in fact still very much narrower than 
suggested by the discussion of Impacts earlier in this paper). The cost of abatement may be modest for 
small cuts, but both the cost and the uncertainty rises steeply for much more aggressive cutbacks.  The 
dotted circle indicates that a rational tradeoff would be to pursue abatement to a level just before these 
costs start to rise sharply, whilst innovation policies seek to generate new options to bring down the 
cost of deeper emission cuts. 
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of abatement schedule as in Figure 2. The figure shows that if the taxes and allowances are set 
on the basis of the expected marginal costs and benefits, but the correct marginal costs are 
higher than expected, then the deadweight or efficiency loss from incorrectly setting a permit 
at level Q rather than Q* is considerably higher than incorrectly setting the tax or charge at t 
rather than t*.4  
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Figure 2: Relative efficiency of prices vs. quantities 
 
As already noted, GHG emissions contribute to an atmospheric stock with a very slow rate of 
decay. The damage contributed by emissions today is effectively the same as those tomorrow, 
and so the marginal benefit of abatement is essentially flat at each moment, while the 
marginal cost of abatement rises rapidly beyond a certain point. The scale of the hazard of 
global warming is very uncertain, as are the future costs of reducing carbon intensity. All 
these are arguments for a stable global carbon price or tax. As more information about the 
damage of global warming arrives, so the optimal tax can be adjusted (just as the allowed 
level of emissions would have to be adjusted). The desirable stability of the carbon price is 
                                                 
4  Weitzman shows that the comparative advantage of prices over quantities is given by the formula ½ 
Variance of MC x (slope of MC -  slope of MB)/(slope of MC)2, and is independent of the uncertainty 
in the position of the marginal benefit schedule, provided that policies are based on unbiased best 
estimates of the schedules. If that schedule is flat then the formula simplifies to ½ Variance of MC 
/(slope of MC). 
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not absolute, but only applies over (possibly quite long) periods of time in which no 
significant new information arrives, as discussed below. In contrast, tradable quotas can give 
rise to volatile prices over quite short periods of time, as illustrated for the EU ETS in the next 
section.   
Hoel and Karp (2001) explore this question more carefully in a calibrated linear-quadratic 
dynamic model of global warming and confirm Weitzman’s insight robustly. Pizer (2002) 
demonstrates the same result based on simulating a stochastic computable general equilibrium 
model, while as noted, the PAGE model discussed in chapter 2 demonstrates the apparent 
insensitivity of the SCC (including the carbon price with no equity weighting) to the level of 
emissions on a business-as-usual path. These simple economic arguments suggest that there is 
a stronger case for a fixed, stable carbon price (via taxes or some other mechanism) than for 
fixed or stable quota allocations, as long as the dominant determinants of emissions are to do 
with price more than regulatory structure, and that the carbon price would be significant 
relative to other economic forces. 
These generic economic considerations need to be tested against specific applications. It is 
unclear the extent to which the likely characteristics of the cost and benefit schedules (Fig.1) 
may in themselves affect the Weitzman argument. The assumption that short-run mitigation 
has very little impact on long-run damages may not be true concerning some new power 
sector investments, such as the choice between a coal vs. nuclear or renewable plant that may 
last many decades. Moreover, whilst the Stern Review acknowledges the Weitzman argument 
for the short term, it also argues that increasing long-term risks make it desirable to aim at an 
equilibrium GHG concentration below 550ppm (CO2 equivalent). This is equivalent to 
specifying a stock of GHGs, or a quantity limit on the amount of fossil fuel that can be burned 
over the next 100-200 years. The argument for choosing this quantity target, loosely stated, is 
that mitigation costs are too high to aim at lower levels (e.g. 450ppm), while overshooting 
550ppm runs serious risk of irreversible and catastrophically expensive future outcomes. If so, 
then setting a quantity limit on the amount of carbon released appears prudent. Which is 
correct?  The Stern Review leaves this open, noting that “Establishing a carbon price, 
through tax, trading or regulation, is an essential foundation for climate-change policy.” 
(Stern, 2006, xviii, emphasis in original).  
The two views can be reconciled by noting that the carbon price should be moderately stable 
over reasonable time periods (1-15 years if no new information about the costs of climate 
change arrives) but over longer periods of time the price will need to be adjusted to balance 
cumulative carbon emissions with absorptive capacity. Hepburn et. al. (2006) discuss the 
relation between a longer-run target quantity and the need to stabilise the carbon price in the 
short to medium run. 
The Stern Review proposes 550ppm as a ceiling, but does not thereby conclude that the annual 
(or even decadal) emissions should necessarily be quantity-controlled. Indeed, the Review points 
out that there are many trajectories consistent with meeting the eventual 550ppm target, and that 
some will clearly be more expensive than others. Unfortunately, without knowing the rate at 
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which cost-effective low-carbon technologies will diffuse and improved technologies be 
developed, it is hard to choose between possible paths. Faced with such uncertainty, and given 
that the SCC may be relatively insensitive to the choice of path, it makes more sense for the 
market, guided by the carbon price, to determine the least cost path to the target. 
 
3.2 International and whole economy approaches 
A carbon tax is an efficient instrument to the extent that energy price is a major determinant of 
the relevant decisions. Grubb (2007) argues that about half CO2 emissions in industrialised 
countries arise from sectors which are economically ‘well behaved’ in this sense. These comprise 
principally power generation and heavy industry, sectors in which coal is the principal source of 
emissions and the price of energy – and relative fuel prices – is the dominant determinant of 
emissions. However, buildings account for around a third of CO2 emissions (including the 
embodied emissions through their power consumption), and there is overwhelming empirical 
evidence that emissions from buildings and the appliances within them are determined far more 
by building codes and appliance standard regulation, than by energy prices. This is due to a mix 
of contractual failure (the ‘tenant-landlord’ split), informational failures (consumer ignorance 
about the energy/emission characteristics of their purchases) and behavioural economic issues 
particularly concerning economically trivial expenditures. These observations do not make price 
in these sectors irrelevant, but it does imply than an efficient response has to involve a range of 
measures in addition to carbon pricing.  
Even in the economically ‘well-behaved’ sectors, there could be difficulties in determining the 
true ‘additionality’ of carbon taxes. Thus most countries levy heavy excise taxes on road fuel 
which can be thought of as part of a system of road user charging, and could claim quite 
reasonably that some part of this fuel excise were a carbon tax and could be reduced to offset the 
agreed carbon tax (Newbery, 2006). Moreover, even under the clear carbon incentives of the EU 
ETS, its carbon effectiveness in some countries remains blunted by regulatory structures that 
prevent the pass-through of marginal carbon prices to final electricity prices (Sijm, 2006).  
This points to fundamental difficulties in trying to define international mitigation policy through 
an agreement on carbon taxation. Such an agreement would not give an incentive for 
governments to fix market problems that increase emissions – indeed, by making carbon a source 
of revenue it could arguably do the opposite - and the real additionality of any such agreement 
could be almost impossible to define relative to existing tax and subsidy structures. Moreover, it 
touches on one of the most sensitive of all areas of domestic policy, namely sovereign authority 
to define the level and incidence of taxation.  A stark illustration is the fate of the EU carbon tax. 
Despite the context of a successful completed Treaty of Maastricht, establishing the goal of a 
single market underpinned by the dilution of sovereign decision-making powers, the original EC 
proposal for a unified EU carbon tax was debated for five years after its proposal in 1990 before 
finally being buried in favour of far looser structure of guidance and partial convergence in 
relation to existing petroleum taxes.  Globally, there is simply no supranational authority to 
which countries would be willing to entrust power to set tax levels, and override national 
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sovereignty to choose other or complementary instruments.  Hence the focus of the Kyoto 
Protocol squarely on agreeing quantified goals for emission reductions, leaving the choice of 
implementation to national decision-making. Allowance for trading between countries increases 
flexibility and encourage internationally efficient reductions, but without necessarily determining 
the same carbon price across all sectors of all participating economies. We discuss the challenges 
of international coordination further at the end of this chapter. 
 
3.3 Tax vs. trading in domestic policy 
The choice of tax vs. trading has more practical scope in terms of sovereign choice over the 
selection of domestic instruments. At this level there are additional differences between taxes 
and quotas that are important, although opposed. Pollution taxes raise revenue and allow other 
taxes to be reduced, thus reducing deadweight costs. The so-called “double dividend” is 
discussed in Newbery (2005) and need not detain us here. Quotas could be auctioned to produce 
revenue, so this is not necessarily a critical difference. The more important difference is that 
quotas are normally allocated freely – not only to countries, but within countries to eligible firms 
under grandfather clauses - in order to buy off opposition to their introduction. Again, this 
difference is not decisive, because countries could decide on a carbon price or tax, with each 
retaining their own tax proceeds (which has obvious attractions), subject to the problem of 
additionality mentioned above for the case of transport fuel excise taxes. One such example is 
the UK Climate Change Levy, which was imposed on industry but compensated for by a 
reduction in the National Insurance Tax (a tax on labour) paid by those liable for the tax. 
Nor is it immediately obvious whether quotas or taxes offer countries greater opportunities to 
renege on any international climate change agreement, as that will depend on the reliability of 
GHG monitoring and the sanctions available to other countries to punish any deviations. If under 
the WTO countries can impose border taxes to compensate for “unfair subsidies” (i.e. a failure to 
properly charge for GHG emissions) and if these emissions can be observed, then tax floors may 
work. If countries use quota allocations to preferentially favour trade-exposed sectors, and are 
able to understate emissions from other sectors, then the agreement may come under greater 
pressure. 
For some sectors, like household energy consumption, a carbon tax would appear intrinsically 
simpler in part just because of the transactional complications of trading instruments 
(notwithstanding the need to address other issues surrounding buildings-related energy use). In 
sectors like power generation, Weiztman-like arguments and the need for investment security 
favour a tax-like instrument.  Such an application to industrial energy use, however, might 
exacerbate concerns about international competitiveness impacts.  Indeed, an important final 
complication is that taxes, because they combine the function of a price incentive with large 
revenue transfers, are not only politically difficult but tend to be adapted heavily to reflect pre-
existing circumstances. A study of Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark (Anderson, 2004) 
notes that, despite the strong common view in favour of carbon taxes since the early 1990s, the 
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actual pattern of “carbon” taxes to emerge varies radically between this group of relatively 
closely-aligned four Scandinavian countries, in terms of level, coverage, derogations etc. 
In the EU, considerations of sovereignty, legal and institutional structures, and the inherent 
political difficulties of more visible large-scale revenue transfers embodied in a carbon tax 
combined to make the EU ETS the only practical way to establish an EU-wide carbon price 
across the core power and industrial sectors.5 Establishing a single carbon price across almost 
half the EU’s total emissions itself, in principle, offers big efficiency gains that should not lightly 
be cast aside. Moreover, in principle this need not stop each country auctioning off quotas 
(collecting the same revenue as a tax at the market-clearing price on that level of emissions). In 
practice the European ETS requires 90% of these quotas (during the Kyoto first period of 2008-
12) to be allocated or “grand-fathered”. If quotas are issued and valid for a long time period and 
can be banked and borrowed (as with the US sulphur cap-and-trade system) the inter-temporal 
carbon price should be arbitraged, but this would not necessarily ensure that it remained constant 
even in present value over time (as the volatility of futures prices of storable commodities 
demonstrates). Nevertheless, the absence of a supranational tax authority – and the establishment 
of the EU ETS – are not arguments against stabilising the price of carbon.  
All this suggests that efficient climate policy may need a combination of price and non-price 
measures, set within the content of an international agreement that gives incentives for 
governments to address the full set of inefficiencies in domestic price and regulatory structures 
that determine emissions.  We return to this point below after considering the way the current EU 
Emissions Trading System works and how it may be improved. 
 
4   The European Emissions Trading Scheme  
The European Union has agreed the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) as its 
principle means of reducing emissions of the main greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, CO2. Each 
year from 2005 until the end of 2007 each country allocates at least 95% of its overall 
allowances to eligible firms (at least 90% for Phase II, 2008-12), who are then free to trade 
them within the EU. The resulting price of an EU Emission Allowance (EUA) for 1 tonne of 
CO2 is determined by EU-wide demand and supply of EUAs. At the end of each calendar year 
covered industries, of which the largest is the electricity supply industry, must deliver EUAs 
equal in total to their recorded emissions in that year. EUAs can be held until the end of 2007, 
at which point a new scheme starts and the old EUAs become worthless.  
Figure 3 shows prices in the EU ETS for both first and second period delivery. Prices rose 
initially, as the European Commission sought to strengthen allocation plans, and stayed 
                                                 
5  One might observe that allocating free EUAs for 95% of the power sector generated huge rent 
transfers from electricity consumers to generators, as they were able to include the EUA price in the 
variable cost of generation (as illustrated below), whereas a carbon tax would have allowed 
governments to reduce other taxes and so compensated consumers. Of course, auctioning the quotas 
would have had the same effect. Arguably the ETS was successfully launched as politicians (and 
consumer action groups) failed to appreciate the impact on electricity prices and the large rent 
transfers, while the electricity companies did. 
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relatively high until Spring 2006 when detailed verified information about supply and demand 
of EUAs became public.6 The price of first period EUAs, which expire on 31 Dec 2007 and 
cannot be carried forward to the second period, has subsequently crashed as supply now 
appears high relative to demand, although the price in the second period remains moderately 
stable around €15/tonne CO2. The market for EUAs has clearly been volatile. Moreover, the 
price of EUAs can be expected to feed through to the wholesale price of electricity in a 
competitive market, although where final prices are regulated, the price could be held down to 
offset the windfall profits earned on the allocated EUAs. 
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Figure 3: Price of CO2 in €/tonne 
Source: EEX 
 
Some evidence that the EUA price does indeed feed through to the wholesale price is 
provided by figure 4, which shows the forward base year French and German electricity 
contract prices traded on the EEX, and the cost of the EUAs required for gas-fired or coal-
fired generation.  
The May 2006 fall in the futures price of French baseload electricity (all generated by nuclear 
power) drops by an amount better explained by the EUA gas cost than the EUA coal cost, 
even though the price in France is clearly set by the price in Germany (which has dominantly 
coal-fired base load electricity). We can probe the link between electricity, gas and carbon 
                                                 
6  The European Commission published verified emissions data for 11,500 plants on 15 May 2006, 
suggesting that there was an excess of EUAs, either because of over-allocation of out-performance in 
emissions reduction, and this naturally caused prices to fall. 
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prices by examining the “clean spark spread” – that is, the price of electricity less the cost of 
gas needed in a combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) of 50% efficiency and net of the cost of 
the EUAs required in such a plant. It measures the return to the capital cost of the plant (and 
any other non-fuel costs), and should tend towards the return needed to reward new 
investment, at least so long as CCGT remains an attractive investment choice). 
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Figure 4: Response of forward electricity price to change in EUA price 
 
Figure 5 graphs the clean spark spread in Britain, Germany and the Netherlands. The visual 
interpretation is that after an initial period of adjustment the gross profit margin has returned 
to where it had been, suggesting that most if not all of the EUA opportunity cost has been 
passed through into the wholesale price. Various authors have undertaken more careful 
econometric estimates of the extent to which EUA prices are passed through into electricity 
prices (IEA, 2007). Honkatukia et al (2006) estimated that 75-90% of EUA price changes 
were passed through to the Finnish Nord Pool day-ahead prices, even though the Nordic 
market is dominated by nuclear and hydro electricity (but linked to the rest of Europe). In a 
sophisticated boot-strapping econometric exercise Sijm, Neuhoff and Chen (2006) examined 
the impact of EUA price changes on the cost of generating from coal in Germany, finding 
complete pass-through for peak prices and 60-70% for off-peak prices (when interconnectors 
are less constrained and imports introduce competition from other fuels). In the Netherlands 
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they found that 60-80% of the EUA price changes are passed through for peak hours for gas 
generation, and 70-80% passed through in off-peak hours for coal generation.7  
Several consequences follow from this unsurprising conclusion. The first is that the free 
allocation of EUAs to power generators constituted a large windfall gain, as they we 
compensated for the increase in carbon cost of generation but could sell the electricity at the 
price inclusive of the carbon cost. For example, in Germany the second phase allocation of 
EUAs to the power sector will be 205 million p.a. which at a price of 20€/tonne CO2 amounts 
to a windfall gain of over €4 billion p.a. (and that is for just one of the 25 countries). There is 
therefore a strong case for not allocating the electricity supply industry (ESI) more than a very 
small number of EUAs in future periods. The second conclusion is less obvious, and provides 
an additional argument for stabilising the price of EUAs, rather than allowing the price to be 
determined by supply and demand. 
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Figure 5: Gross profit of CCGT after paying for fuel and carbon 
Source: Platts 
 
4.1 The impact of the ETS on the gas market 
Under the current organisation of the ETS, the price of EUAs is determined by supply and 
demand, and both depend on the extent to which the ESI can substitute less carbon-intensive 
fuels like gas for more carbon-intensive fuels like coal though changes in the merit order. This 
                                                 
7  The impact of EUA price changes are roughly twice as high for coal as it is more carbon intensive. 
As Dutch electricity prices are above neighbouring countries, there may be less scope for passing cost 
increases through fully. Explaining spot electricity prices is particularly difficult as they are affected 
by contract cover, market power, the extent of the market, i.e. whether interconnectors are constrained, 
and the supply-demand balance, so the match between theory and evidence is impressive. 
 13
is nicely illustrated in Figure 6, which shows the daily evolution of generation in Britain over 
a short period of time in which the UK gas price increased sharply.  
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Figure 6: The impact of gas and carbon costs on the British merit order 
 
As the cost of running gas-fired plant increased relative to coal, so the share of coal-fired 
generation increased sharply, increasing total emissions from the ESI as coal is more carbon-
intensive than gas. Thus as the price of gas increases, the price of EUAs increases, as the 
demand from coal-fired generation will increase the demand for EUAs. This will raise the 
cost of burning coal instead of gas and reduce the extent to which electricity producers will 
switch from coal to gas in response to a gas price rise. The effect of fixing the quantity of 
EUAs, rather than their price, is that the elasticity of demand for gas will decrease (i.e. gas 
demand will become less sensitive to the price of gas because of the indirect effects on 
substitutes feeding through the EUA price change).  
While the international market for coal is reasonably competitive, the same is not true for gas, 
particularly in Europe, which is heavily dependent on importing Russian gas from the 
monopoly supplier, Gazprom. In addition, gas producers and suppliers in the EU have more 
market power than the suppliers of other fuels, and are frequently vertically integrated into 
electricity generation. Ruhrgas, the dominant German gas company since its controversial 
merger with E.On, has a dominant position is gas supply through its control of its gas pipeline 
network, and an incentive to raise the price of gas to raise electricity prices and hence the 
profits of its merged partner, E.On (Henriksson, 2005). The market power of gas suppliers 
depends on the elasticity of demand for gas – if the elasticity is high so that demand falls 
sharply when prices increase, the dominant gas suppliers will have little market power. But if 
the elasticity is low or reduced because of the ETS, then gas suppliers will have more market 
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power, and greater incentive to raise gas prices. There are therefore grounds for concern that 
the particular way climate change policy works in the EU through pricing a fixed supply of 
EUAs may amplify the existing market power in the gas market. The obvious solution is to 
cut the link between the demand for EUAs and their price by fixing or stabilising the price of 
the EUAs. 
 
5  Stabilising the price of carbon and hybrid instruments 
To recap, there are good economic arguments for fixing the price of carbon rather than fixing 
the total level of emissions in each period and allowing the market to determine the price. 
There are good political economy arguments for launching climate change policies through 
issuing tradable permits, as in the ETS (and most other market-oriented pollution abatement 
schemes). Various authors have argued that it may be possible to combine the best of both 
worlds through various hybrid approaches that are neither the two extremes of Weitzman’s 
(1974) Prices or Quantities.8 Thus Pizer (2002) argues for an initial allocation of permits, 
followed by the issuing of additional permits at a fixed price.  In the case of the ETS this 
could be done either by the European Commission (or some body) being prepared to buy and 
sell any number of EUAs at the fixed price, or by replacing the ETS by a fixed carbon tax per 
tonne of carbon burned. The former is likely to be politically more attractive than the latter, 
and can be made cash positive or neutral to the EC by suitable reductions in the allocations of 
EUAs each year.  
A similar proposal termed the “safety valve” is discussed by Jacoby and Ellerman (2004), 
while Hepburn (2006) surveys the range of hybrid instruments, including price ceilings and 
floors, and penalties for failing to deliver permits (which effectively cap the price at the 
penalty level – the method used in Britain for Renewable Obligation Certificates). These 
alternative approaches to reducing or eliminating price volatility differ in the financial risks 
they place on the agency entrusted to stabilise the price. While there is little risk in capping 
the price (and penalties would generate extra income), the main problem is in providing a 
floor, as buying permits to support the price could be costly. Of course, if sufficiently few 
permits are issued in the first place, with the balance sold at a fixed price, this risk can be 
made arbitrarily small, but that is not the present design of the ETS, and any change to the 
ETS would require the agreement of the member states. Such design issues are perhaps best 
left to the post-2012 period. 
There remains one important issue that cannot be avoided. The social cost of carbon depends 
on ethical judgements as noted above, as well as economic and climate change forecasts, and 
is highly uncertain (as demonstrated by the width of the 5-95% confidence bands around the 
mean value). The Kyoto agreements and the ETS allocations were the outcome of a political 
                                                 
8 as Weitzman himself recognised when he added that “The issue of prices vs. quantities has to be a 
‘second best’ problem by its very nature simply because there is no good a priori reason for limiting 
attention to just these two particular signals”. (Weitzman, 1974, p481). 
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bargaining process, albeit one influenced by ethics (particularly the contentious issue of the 
values of lives saved), as well as climate science. Any carbon price would likely have to be 
negotiated, perhaps better informed than before (as a result of the remarkable impact of and 
debates provoked by the Stern Review, and the ever greater confidence attached to the climate 
science). It seems most unlikely that any negotiation would agree anything like the Stern 
central value of $312/tC ($85.1/tCO2), which would quadruple the price of burning coal, 
compared to figures around $70-180/tC ($19.1-49.1/tCO2) at which EUAs have traded. On 
the other hand the ETS range sits comfortably with the PAGE equity weighted estimates of 
chapter 2. What then should be the target carbon price (or floor) that the EU should aim at, if 
we accept the desirability of stabilising the price, recognising the considerable uncertainty 
(and disagreements) about the right value? 
One possible answer is to aim at the highest politically sustainable level, recognising that any 
political compromise is likely to fall short of the true SCC, but put in place an escalator that 
increases its value in real terms by, say, 2-3% p.a. (which is what should happen anyway, as 
chapter 2 argued). This model of an escalating charge has been followed for setting the road 
fuel duty in Britain in the 1990s. It was also adopted as a way of adjusting the price of water 
towards a level that more closely reflected long-run marginal cost after privatisation in 1989. 
Prices were adjusted each year in line with the retail price index, less an efficiency factor, X, 
but plus a capital adjustment factor, K, hence RPI-X+K. The lower the agreed value, the more 
important this should be stated as a floor, with possible upward revisions as new data or more 
political consensus (or a broader coverage of countries) indicates. If such a commitment could 
be made credible, it would do much to reduce investment risk. If any ceiling were set not too 
far above the floor, then the floor might be raised in response to sustained upward pressure on 
the ceiling, as with crawling peg exchange rates. If the price settled at the floor, then the 
fraction of EUAs to be auctioned rather than allocated should be increased (and more held 
back to support the floor). 
 
6  Carbon price-investment security for the longer term 
The current allocations under the Kyoto Protocol & EU ETS end in 2012, injecting 
considerable uncertainty into subsequent commitments and prices. The DTI’s Energy Review 
is very clear about the need for longer-term carbon price signals:  
“the Government is committed to there being a continuing carbon price signal which investors 
take into account when making decisions. This is particularly important given the scale of 
new investment required in UK electricity generation capacity. The EU ETS is here to stay 
beyond 2012 and will remain the key mechanism for providing this signal. The Government 
will continue to work with its international partners to strengthen the EU ETS to make it more 
effective. We will keep open the option of further measures to reinforce the operation of the 
EU ETS in the UK should this be necessary to provide greater certainty to investors.” (Energy 
Review p157).  
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The Energy Review is, however, silent on how greater certainty could be provided. This 
section sets out why current instruments will not deliver an adequate investment response, and 
discusses the options for addressing this.9  
 
6.1 Economic fundamentals: why the market may fail  
Uncertainty is not new: investors face it all the time. There are, however, three things that make 
the low carbon electricity issue fundamentally different: 
- The risk associated with carbon price is largely policy and political – risk that private 
investors find particularly hard to judge and manage, and where alternate strategies include 
investing in lobbying, or just waiting for policy uncertainty to be resolved.  
- The timescales of investment are very long, and there is a marked disjuncture between the 
time horizons of most corporate or equity investors (seeking typically 10-15% rate of return 
for more speculative projects, though considerably lower for low-risk mainstream utility 
investments), and those of government (discount rates that reflect ethical bases for consistent 
intergenerational decision-making, as in the Stern report (of about 1.4%), and the UK 
Government Green Book rate of 3.5% - see Chapter 2). In itself this would not necessarily 
matter (other investments are also long-lived but do not need special treatment), but it is the 
combination of long timescales and policy risk that is damaging, 
- While fossil-fuel generation is at the margin and setting the electricity price, conventional 
generators will be largely hedged against both fuel and carbon price risk, as these will determine 
the price of electricity. Investors take comfort from the link between the marginal (fuel plus 
carbon) cost of generation and the electricity price, and are thus able to shift much of the input 
cost risk through to consumers, at least if they have a balanced portfolio of plant. Companies that 
specialise in renewables or nuclear power are exposed to an electricity price driven by the 
volatile marginal fuel cost and a possibly volatile carbon price, and so face more risk (Roques et 
al., 2006). Thus even with a fixed and guaranteed carbon price, the structure of electricity 
markets places the risk associated with uncertainties in the electricity price on low carbon 
investors. Again such risks are not necessarily indicative of market failure, but they may amplify 
the underlying problem of policy risk. 
 
Other market actors. Consumers should be keen to hold shares in generation companies whose 
costs are independent of fuel and carbon prices, in order to hedge the electricity price risks they 
face. Equivalently, suppliers (or even final consumers, as in Finland for nuclear power) may be 
willing to sign contracts for low-carbon electricity to hedge their exposure to electricity price 
risk. It has been suggested that insurance companies should be willing to finance low carbon 
generation with electricity bonds (linked to the long-term purchase price contracted for the 
output of the power station) and issue these as part of a pension portfolio, offering insurance 
against the future cost of electricity. However, this would require pension funds to actively 
                                                 
9 The House of Commons (2006) report New Nuclear? Examining the Issues discusses the importance 
of and mechanisms for long-term carbon pricing at paras 179 et seq. 
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decide to make risky and possibly very illiquid investment decisions in new technologies - 
opening them to charges of failing in their fiduciary duties to pensioners. 
The most fundamental conclusion is that without more stable long-term signals, investors will 
defer difficult decisions, and are more likely to adopt the lowest-risk - to them - and most 
flexible investments. Fundamentally, this favours investment in combined cycle gas turbines 
(CCGTs): low cost, quick to build, and with the fuel and carbon risks passed on to customers.  
Sustained over the coming decades, such investments would not provide either a secure, or a 
very low carbon, electricity system, albeit one that may be preferable to investing in more 
expensive plant burning cheap coal. 
The Stern Review is even more explicit than the Energy Review about the need for a credible 
long-term carbon price: “In order to influence behaviour and investment decisions, investors 
and consumers must believe that the carbon price will be maintained into the future. This is 
particularly important for investments in long-lived capital stock.” (Stern, 2006, pxix). The 
Review is more specific about the design of instruments to achieve this goal, and its chapter 
15 considers these issues in depth, drawing out strong implications for the future design of the 
ETS, although without explicitly stating the need to stabilise the resulting carbon price (Stern, 
2006, box 15.3, p 337).  
 
6.2 Policy options for longer term investment security.  
This chapter has argued that it is desirable to stabilise the price of carbon (around a steadily 
rising path) rather than limiting the annual level of emissions, and this objective also achieves 
the other desirable goal of delivering the desired low-carbon investments at least cost. There 
are several ways to establish longer term, low-carbon incentives that could be considered in 
principle.  
 
6.2.1 Long period commitments.   
If Phase III EU ETS allocations could be agreed soon, and specified in a single period with a 
timescale covering investment time horizons, this would solve the problem.  Neither is 
credible; it is debatable even whether the latter (much longer time periods of allocation) is 
desirable, since it would lock in an allocation for potentially a couple of decades whilst both 
science and politics of the issue are likely to develop far more rapidly.  
 
6.2.2 Allowing unconstrained banking and borrowing of EUAs over multiple periods 
Allowing extensive banking into, and borrowing from, future periods in principle would allow 
an intertemporal market to emerge with incentives and expectations feeding back to present 
prices. The most obvious way to bring some longer-term security is then to try and agree 
several rounds of quantity constraints in advance. A related approach is proposed for UK 
domestic policy on national emissions in the draft UK Climate Change Bill, which proposes 
5-year budget periods defining allowed national emissions, which must be ‘set at least three 
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periods (i.e. for fifteen years) ahead’ (HMG, 2007). In itself such aggregate domestic quantity 
limits may be difficult for industry to translate to a future price, and in practice would leave 
the actual price in the power and industry sectors still contingent upon the EU ETS, not on the 
domestic targets.  
 The same approach could in principle be taken for the EU ETS itself; with full 
banking and borrowing, this in turn would be very similar to simply setting a longer 
commitment period, with the same fundamental trade-off. The difficulties of allocation and 
burden sharing several periods ahead would be daunting at an EU level – and greater still at a 
global level.10  
 Pizer et al (2002) set out in detail a fundamentally different approach to the problem. 
They show how defining appropriate long term price-based rules for allocations in a 
sequential emissions trading system could be used to chart a long-term price path for quantity-
based systems.  The biggest difficulty lies in translating such theory into practice. It requires 
credibility of a governmental commitment to both a long term target price, and to sticking 
with the rules for translating that into allocations over many rounds. Thus it does not 
necessarily solve the fundamental problem of the reluctance of markets to speculate – and 
invest – around political risk. It may not remove the volatility associated with the arrival of 
important new information (of the kind that caused the EUA price drop in May 2006, noted 
above) and additional measures, such as floors or caps, may be needed.  It is governments that 
define the policy environment, and that are the best placed to bear the risks of changes in 
future policy directions, and should therefore seek ways of bearing or under-writing those 
risks for investors.   
 
6.2.3 Long term price declaration 
A simpler but less robust route would be for governments to set out, perhaps in legislation, 
planned carbon prices further ahead than the specific instruments and allocations agreed at EU 
or international level.  The issue again is one of credibility. This would be significantly 
enhanced if implementation of the EU ETS included mechanisms (such as minimum price 
auctions) that would enable direct implementation of a price floor – though this remains only 
a partial solution to the credibility problem.  If governments are really serious about any price 
declaration, the obvious question is whether and how they should transmit that conviction to 
the private sector in legal form - through contracts that bind successor governments, as 
follows. 
 
                                                 
10 Indeed in the Kyoto negotiations, the original US proposal did suggest negotiations on two 
commitment periods simultaneously with banking and borrowing between them – a prospect that was 
rapidly dropped as the extreme difficulty of agreeing even on one became apparent (Grubb, 1999). 
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6.2.4 Contract-for-difference (CfD) on the future carbon price (carbon contracts).  
The fourth option would be for governments to issue a contract-for-difference (CfD) with 
investors on the future carbon price. 11 This could be a simple CfD in which the contract states 
a strike price of e.g. 15 €/tonne CO2 (or 55 €/tC), and these are either sold or issued in 
proportion to declared net capacity of new zero-carbon generation. The holder would then be 
entitled to receive the strike price less the actual carbon price implicit in any UK-wide carbon 
instrument that applies to fossil generation (and if this price were above the strike price then 
the holder would be obligated to pay the amount by which the price were above the strike 
price).12  
An alternative would be to issue or sell a one-sided CfD with a floor price, say 10 €/tonne 
CO2, with the issuer obligated to pay any shortfall below this floor price, but the holder would 
benefit from any upside. Another variant on this that has been explored by Ismer and Neuhoff 
(2006) is to issue put options on the carbon price. These CfDs could be exercised either at 
particular dates (perhaps averaged over the previous year) or (particularly in the case of put 
options) over an extended period. Such instruments would provide a powerful commitment 
signal by the Government (or the European Commission) to the continuation of the ETS or its 
successor, and would also help stabilise the future (and hence, with banking, the present) 
carbon price.  
 
6.2.5 Low-carbon electricity contracts 
A way which is less direct from a carbon standpoint, but more direct in terms of electricity 
investment incentives, would be to sell a long-term CfD on the price of electricity from low or 
zero-carbon generation. This would also provide a hedge against fuel price uncertainty. An 
obvious objection to this is that if there is a demand for such instruments, the market should 
offer them, and, as with government-financed strategic gas storage, such market interventions 
might distort the normal market and worse, displace comparable, more efficiently designed 
instruments. The defence would be that there is a missing market for carbon and no obvious 
source of private supply, as the prime risk is political. If so, then the direct approach already 
described seems best suited to address that market failure. Nevertheless, the Government may 
wish to consider such contracts as part of its commitment to alleviating pensioner fuel 
poverty, where such a contract may allow the future cost of dealing with such poverty lower 
as it ought them be possible to finance the capital-intensive generation at lower rates of 
interest (i.e. more indexed debt).  
There are of course other options, some of which require cruder, direct intervention, such as 
direct government investment or subsidy for preferred low carbon electricity sources. These 
                                                 
11  See for example House of Commons (2006) at paras 179 et seq. 
12  This would require the Government to be quite explicit about the equivalent carbon value of any 
instrument that might replace the ETS, particularly if this took the form of a carbon tax (not an energy 
tax like the Climate Change Levy). If there were no such instrument that specifically charged 
electricity generators in proportion to the CO2 emitted, then the price would be deemed to be zero.  
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face well-known and tested objections, and run counter to the entire thrust of UK energy 
policy over recent decades towards liberalisation and a declining direct role for the state in 
investment decisions, and so are unlikely to be contemplated and are not considered here.  
There is however one related set of issues that cannot be dodged, which is the need for 
appropriate investment in the UK electricity network in ways that would support low carbon 
generation sources, and associated questions around the mandate and powers of OFGEM.  
 
6.3 Preliminary conclusion. 
These options all have pros and cons. The first – although it seems to attract the most 
attention – risks ending up with an uneasy compromise that does not in fact deliver either 
objective: for example a 10-year fixed allocation for post 2012, finally agreed in e.g. 2011, 
could be too long to give flexibility but still too short to help big investments. To the extent 
that option (b) still relies on future legislative decisions, rather than individual contractual 
commitments, it does not resolve perceptions of political risk. Option (c) also requires the 
market to have a high degree of faith in governmental promises and institutions. 
 Options (d) and (e) address this problem, by setting the commitment in individual 
contracts – the same status as any other government contractual obligation that can be 
matched by compensation clauses. Neither is equivalent to a “whole economy” (or even 
whole sector) carbon price, but for the investing counter-parties they do ensure that the 
political risk is borne by the government, not the investors. By the same token, they may face 
the most resistance from governments reluctant to bind themselves to such future liabilities in 
the event of a weak carbon price. However, because the investment risk in this respect 
intrinsically arises because of uncertainty about future policy, there is a compelling case that 
governments should bear these risks directly in respect of long-term, low carbon investments.  
All the options raise issues of implementation, which are quite complex in the case of the two 
“contracts” ideas that seek to give contractual force to long-term price goals. These 
consequently must rigorously define either additionality of carbon savings from individual 
projects (for d), or qualifying generating sources (for e).  Defining the problem as being 
specifically to do with electricity investment may suggest that the electricity contracts route 
provides a more direct solution. However, it would be helpful to map the relative 
characteristics and questions around the two ‘contract’ options side by side, since many 
aspects might be shared, and might yet throw up fundamental difficulties.  
As always the difficulties of securing agreement on such measures decreases the larger and 
more diverse the set of countries that need to reach agreement. Options (a) and (b) would 
clearly require international agreement amongst all those countries involved in the carbon 
pricing / trading scheme. In practice, option (c) would as well, if it is to have much credibility. 
Thus a further, and potentially decisive, feature of the two contract options is that any 
government, if it chose to do so, could establish long-term contracts-for-difference for any 
facility sited in its territory. This would be a compelling a statement of its own confidence in 
future carbon prices, or at least, its willingness to bear the risk of protecting domestic low 
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carbon investments against the possibility of failure of the international effort around more 
general carbon pricing instruments.  
Such commitments would consequently lower the cost of delivering future lower-carbon 
technologies. The main downside is the risk of other countries free-riding, which suggests the 
importance of international sticks and carrots for climate change commitment, to which we 
finally turn.  
 
7 Evolution towards a global climate change agreement? 
 
A tonne of GHG released anywhere has the same global impact regardless of its country of 
origin, but the damage of climate change varies across countries, and may be more serious in 
the tropics (at least as a share of GDP). Every country has an interest in solving this global 
problem, but not all are equally able or willing to contribute. The international problem is to 
devise policies that will make humanity better off, and which limit the incentives to opt out of 
such agreements; the latter probably implies, at minimum, structures which ultimately make 
each country better off participating than not.  
Similarly, all countries will benefit from the development of cheaper low-carbon technologies 
that lower the total cost of addressing climate change, but their development will be costly. 
Chapter 12 discusses briefly the prospect for international co-operation to help to share this 
cost to encourage the most cost-effective research and deployment strategies to be followed, 
with those best placed to develop each technology encouraged to take the lead. 
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The objective of international negotiation is to maximise the extent (measured by GHG 
emissions) of international co-operation. Figure 7 shows emissions per head on the y-axis and 
population on the x-axis, so that the area of each rectangle is total emissions, with countries 
ranked by emissions per head (as well as showing the division between the industrialised 
countries, as defined in Annex I of the UNFCCC, and those classed as developing countries). 
China accounts for 16% of the world total emissions and the combination of the US, EU and 
China would account for over half of total emissions. If China were to be added to the Annex 
I countries the coverage would be 78% of the total. The larger the share of global emissions 
covered by the co-operating nations, the lower the individual cost of achieving a given level 
of mitigation, and this provides an incentive for each country to encourage as many of the 
high emitters as possible to join the agreement. The first and probably most important step is 
ensure that public opinion and policy makers in the larger emitting countries are made aware 
of the consequences of climate change, and the costs to their country and to others of failing 
to reach international agreement to address them. The next step is to select policy instruments 
that are politically feasible, sustainable, and effective.  
 
7.1 International collaboration on carbon-based instruments  
On the face of it seems easier to negotiate over target emission reductions, and indeed that 
was the format for the Kyoto Protocol. The difficulty lies in the joint problem of agreeing the 
base allocation and the amount of reductions from that to be made. Developing countries 
argue on strong moral grounds that equal per capita entitlements are the only fair long-term 
basis, but the rich countries will never agree to the implied large carbon trade flows that this 
implies. To put this in context, at a carbon price of 50€/tC (13.6€/tCO2)and global emissions 
of 6Gt of carbon per year,13 the value of carbon allowances would be € 300 billion p.a. Quite 
small surpluses or deficits would lead to large transfers.  
 This highlights a tension between different objectives. At one extreme, there is 
significant resistance in some countries (notably in north America) to any significant 
international financial transfer associated with climate change mitigation. At the opposite 
extreme, developing countries may seek to use international emissions trading as a vehicle for 
redressing wider perceived economic imbalances.  It seems unclear why rich countries would 
agree to much bigger transfers through such an indirect route than, for example, in the context 
of the G8+ negotiations on debt relief. Nevertheless two arguments suggest a need for 
compromise between these extremes. The first is simply that international transfers are 
inherent in an efficient trading-based solution to climate change: global efficiency requires 
richer countries to be able to spend money to reduce emissions wherever it is cheapest to do 
so. Second, the general principles agreed in the UNFCCC – and articulated more fully in the 
Stern report – clearly imply that effective, equitable and efficient solutions require rich 
countries to assist poorer countries to abate.  
                                                 
13  Gt – Gigatonnes, and 1 Gt = 1,000 million tonnes. 
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Willingness to spend to these ends is already established: around 1 billion tonnes CO2 
emission reductions from developing country projects under Kyoto’s Clean Development 
Mechanism were sold on international carbon markets during 2005 and 2006 (combined), at 
total expenditure exceeding US$5bn, mostly driven by compliance with the EU ETS (much of 
it in forward transactions, see PointCarbon 2007). The total projected demand of the EU-15 
and Japan to meet their Kyoto obligations is about twice this, a little over 1Gt CO2 each over 
the Kyoto period. Their willingness to secure this is not in doubt (though governments may 
well be able to purchase more cheaply than the private-sector dominated trades in 2005-6) – 
which is not true for Canada.14  
 Various principles can be considered in negotiating the initial allocations that underpin 
such transfers. An equal proportional reduction from current levels has the advantage that the 
largest emitters make the largest initial contribution to solving the problem, but they are also 
the largest contributors to the problem in the first place. As countries become richer their 
economic structure shifts away from energy-intensive manufacturing to less energy-intensive 
services, so their rate of growth of emissions under business as usual (BAU) is likely to be 
lower than for poorer countries poised to expand manufacturing, power and transport sectors 
rapidly. The reductions might be better related to future predicted BAU levels than based on 
emissions at some past date (like the UNFCCC/Kyoto choice of 1990), but the methodology 
for predicting future BAU levels will itself be the subject of argument and will in practice be 
constrained by the requirement that any likely international trade surpluses in carbon are 
modest in scale. 
In theory, the alternative approach to an economically efficient solution would be to agree a 
carbon tax rate to apply to all GHG emissions, with each country keeping the revenue.  This 
has both the pros and cons of avoiding international transfers. The simplest way to levy this 
would be as an excise tax on the carbon content of all fossil fuel, greatly simplifying the 
problem of identifying and taxing CO2 emissions for each source (although other GHGs will 
also have to be dealt with). For the reasons set out in section 2(b) above, this is unlikely to be 
effective or feasible as the principal focus of an international agreement, but it could still be 
considered for certain sectors with ‘well-behaved’ market conditions and minimal problems 
of defining tax additionality. The power sector, and other energy-intensive manufacturing 
sectors, could qualify. Because many of the latter produce internationally traded goods (and 
indeed electricity is increasingly traded internationally), such an approach would logically 
need to be complemented with a border tax on the carbon content of imported goods if they 
                                                 
14 Projections place the total EU deficit at about 1.1Gt CO2, and Japan at about 1.3Gt CO2, after taking 
account of all policies and official governmental procurement plans in place at present. Canada would 
require about 0.5Gt CO2 in total to comply with its Kyoto target, but the present government has 
indicated it is unwilling to purchase international emission reductions.  Since the government cannot 
raise a Parliamentary majority to withdraw from the Kyoto Treaty and clearly has no intention of 
taking the drastic measures that would now be required to deliver the Kyoto target domestically, its 
current posture would place Canada in a position of almost unprecedented willful non-compliance 
with international law to which it has succeeded and ratified.  
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came from non-compliant countries. In principle this could be compatible with WTO rules, in 
part on the grounds that countries not charging for the carbon damage would be providing 
unfair subsidies to their carbon-intensive exports (for detailed discussion see Brewer, 2003; 
2004).  
How do these alternatives compare as choices for international design? First, an explicit 
carbon tax may make border taxes simpler than tradable permits whose price fluctuates, 
although it would be possible to levy a carbon import tax equal to the deemed carbon content 
of best available technology multiplied by either the current carbon permit price or its average 
over some previous period. In addition, it would be much harder (or impossible) to justify 
border tax adjustments for the marginal (opportunity) costs in a trading scheme, as opposed to 
a full tax incurred from a carbon tax (Hepburn et al, 2006).  
Second, the textbook assumption that taxes and permits are equally efficient may not hold: on 
the one hand, international quota exchanges may offer the potential and temptation for large 
countries to exercise market power; whilst any tax agreement would be layered upon highly 
imperfect underlying energy market structures, including subsidies and areas of contractual 
failure. 
Third, as discussed in section 2, the evidence of political economy is that taxes are hard to 
adopt and almost always distorted compared to the ideal (though distortions in emissions 
trading systems are also possible, Neuhoff et al 2006).  
Fourth, as noted some degree of international transfers may be essential to capture the low 
cost options in developing countries. A tax-based agreement would thus need to be 
complemented by some explicit, probably centralised international funding mechanism. 
 Finally, taxes generate revenue that can be used for, inter alia, supporting the development 
and deployment of low-C technologies (and reducing other more distorting taxes).  
For that reason, though, taxes will be opposed by those on whom the taxes fall (i.e. everyone), 
while quotas can be granted in proportion to base use, and can compensate (or, as with the 
electricity supply industry in the EU ETS, overcompensate) emitters for the extra carbon 
charge. In theory emitters could be given tax credits equal to the grand-fathered permit 
allocations (Pezzy 2003), and permit allocations could be progressively reduced with an 
increasing fraction being auctioned, so the differences in the redistributive properties of taxes 
and quotas can be exaggerated. From a political economy perspective, though, it is clearly 
much easier to introduce grandfathered tradable permits (as evidenced by the overwhelming 
preference for cap-and-trade systems to date). 
A hybrid scheme might be allow each country to allocate permits as they join the “carbon 
abatement club” in any way they choose. The share freely allocated should decline over time 
on agreed schedules, with an increasing fraction auctioned. Once a sufficiently large part of 
the world is participating with sufficiently high level of auctioning, it may be much easier to 
switch to an equivalent tax, and thereafter allowances would be traded in for the tax (i.e. fossil 
fuel sellers could either pay the carbon tax or surrender the appropriate number of 
allowances). This hybrid should also work internationally in that those liable to a tax in any 
 25
country could discharge the liability with a permit from an eligible country (one in which the 
permit price were as high as the internationally agreed tax). 
A major problem is that for some countries the implied tax on coal and even oil would be a 
high fraction of its cost, and probably much higher in some developing countries than in much 
richer countries. Thus the local cost of coal in India and China may be considerably below its 
price in rich countries, and so the carbon tax would be a higher proportion. If coal is $60/mt 
imported into Europe, a carbon tax at the rate of $40/mt of coal would give an import tax rate 
of 67% (although the tax would be levied per tC and as a share of the final delivered price the 
rate would be lower). If the domestic price of coal in India were only $30/mt then the relative 
tax rate would be twice as high at 133%.15  
India is a test case, as most Indian states find it impossible to raise electricity prices to cost-
reflective levels, and would likely find it even more politically difficult to pass through 
carbon taxes. Of course, the same argument would apply to permits if their price were 
allowed to be reflected in marginal electricity prices as in most of the EU countries, but with 
regulated prices, free allocations would allow final electricity prices to be held down. 
Subsidies paid by carbon taxes could have a similar effect. If the local carbon tax were set 
using purchasing power exchange rates rather than market exchange rates the result would 
lead to lower $ taxes for the same perceived carbon price, and this might allow an acceptable 
compromise. The broad conclusion, however, is that an international response based explicitly 
around carbon pricing is only likely to be achieved from a process that starts with emission 
cap-and-trade and evolves towards greater auctioning over time. 
 
7.2 International collaboration on longer term instruments and enforcement 
Could international collaboration be extended to any of the options for longer-term carbon 
instruments discussed in the previous section?  For the first option (long period caps) the 
challenge is synonymous with that already discussed.  For the second (pre-commitments on 
the use of banking and borrowing to secure target prices) the difficulties would be multiplied 
many times, and clearly raise questions about the capacity of governments around the world 
to credibly commit their country to such a complex long-term carbon price management 
system. Declaring a long-term price objective is perhaps politically the most plausible, but 
carries the lowest credibility in terms of investment security. The complexity of international 
agreement on either of two contract-based options is also daunting, except to the extent that 
they address a more focused issue, namely relating to the specifics of power sector 
investments.   
 It is not entirely clear how much international agreement in respect of instruments for 
long term investment security matters, however.  If some countries successful implement 
credible longer term incentives, business will be comparing two regimes: one with a clear 
long-term incentive, in which low carbon investments have been to a large degree “de-risked” 
                                                 
15  The carbon tax needed to amount to $40/tonne of coal might be $60/tC, depending on the carbon 
content of the coal. 
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through unilateral government commitments; the other with a short-term carbon control 
instrument only, with the likelihood that additional obligations will be agreed in the future but 
no security at all about their terms and nature. It is not at all obvious that business would be 
prefer the latter: business itself might drive the pressure to underpin short-term commitments 
with longer-term certainty globally.  
Finally, from an economic perspective, the greatest obstacles to securing any international 
agreement concern participation (willingness to accept a commitment) and enforcement 
(delivery of that commitment once written into an agreement). On the incentives, one issue is 
a potential linkage to the question of whether or not countries ‘weight’ a social cost of carbon, 
discussed in chapter 2.  To the extent that SCC forms an operational part of policies (or 
commitments), if the degree of weight that countries attach to global SCC is linked to the 
breadth of participation, then large emitting countries in particular have an incentive to 
participate because of the impact this would have on implementation in other countries.   
The counter-argument is that leadership is essential in fashioning any international treaty, and 
that if all countries start with a low implied SCC-weighting on the grounds of low 
international participation, then the international system may never make progress.  For 
leadership to be effective, other countries would need to be reassured that the leaders have 
effectively committed their future abatement (or tax) policies, lest they believe that any 
additional abatement by new members would be countered by reduced abatement of the 
leaders. Ismer and Neuhoff (2006) show that put options or one-sided contracts for 
differences on the price of carbon can commit a government to maintaining a minimum future 
price for carbon both internally (to its own low-carbon investors) and externally, to signal 
commitment to other countries. An explicit price element in a Treaty may thus, paradoxically, 
assist with the challenge of ensuring compliance. 
 
8 Conclusions 
 
Addressing climate change efficiently requires that GHG emissions are properly priced, that 
relevant markets are not seriously distorted, and that low-carbon technologies are developed 
efficiently (see chapter 13 - that deals with technology support). These objectives require 
various interventions and international co-operation; the reach of carbon pricing in particular 
must expand to encompass all major emitters. These are daunting challenges. Table 1 
summarises key characteristics of the different instrument choices as discussed in this chapter: 
not surprisingly, as in many complex policy choices, there are trade-offs to be made between 
competing objectives.  
Given the immense political difficulty of establishing any carbon pricing system, the advent 
of the EU ETS – which ensures a uniform price of carbon across the major industrial emitting 
sectors for 27 countries – is a very big step forward. It nevertheless remains a highly 
imperfect and incomplete solution, for the reasons set out. Global efficiency requires a 
uniform carbon price across countries and over time (with a gentle increase in the price at a 
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rate of perhaps 2-3% p.a.). The EU ETS alone scores badly on both counts. International 
linkages through the CDM offer only a partial contribution to the global objective, 
particularly in the absence of US participation, and hinge upon cross-border financial flows 
that might become unacceptable in scale if they are to seriously address e.g. the growth in 
Asian developing country emissions. Quota systems also yield unstable prices unless there are 
caps and floors, banking, and/or an agency charged with trading to stabilise the price. The 
current system of 5-year periods embodied in the Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS offer 
flexibility to adapt, but at the cost of exacerbating the temporal problem as its reliance on 
sequential negotiations yields inherent uncertainty about its future evolution.  
Taxes do much better on the temporal dimension, but face the difficulties associated with 
imperfect markets, political resistance, and (particularly in the transport sector) establishing 
additionality of the instrument. Taxes may also be (even) harder to globalise.  
A gradual transition from cap-and-trade schemes to carbon taxation, through increasing levels 
of auctioning over time, holds attractions that justify serious further work on the political-
economic aspects. There are interesting hybrid schemes, such as auction releases with a 
commitment to a floor and ceiling price that evolve in response to success or otherwise in 
limiting the cumulative emissions of GHGs, which could address some of these concerns, but 
as ever the main problem is designing a means of reaching international agreement to 
underpin a collective commitment to reducing these cumulative emissions. The Stern Review 
has signalled the seriousness of the task, and by placing high values on the social cost of 
carbon and the benefit-cost ratio of mitigation has endeavoured to convince the world that the 
problem is serious but worth collective action. 
Finally, achieving an international climate change agreement with sufficient coverage will be 
an evolutionary process, combining a quest for instruments that command consensus support 
with an attempt to achieve efficiency in mitigating climate change. The first typically involve 
quantity instruments and targets to achieve satisfactory burden sharing, while the second 
require markets to equilibrate prices across time and space. Designing the appropriate 
sequence of national and international instruments to achieve this is challenging.  
In this sense the power sector, with its relative international homogeneity of production 
processes and international market for equipment, is probably better placed than many others 
to achieve these two objectives through careful design to achieve efficient, sustainable and 
credible instruments. As indicated in the Introductory chapter (Chapter 1), power generation 
remains the single biggest source of CO2 emissions globally, and is a prime driver of 
projected global emissions growth.  If constructing a global regime to cover all sources proves 
too difficult, an agreement that builds out from and improves the EU ETS and other emerging 
trading initiatives, to establish a carbon price across the world’s electricity systems, along the 
principles we have discussed, would still be a huge step forward. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of different economic instruments at national and international 
levels 
 Tax Tradable Quotas Price 
contracts1
Quota 
offsets2
Political 
feasibility 
*  *** ** *** 
Single-
period 
efficiency 
*** ** n/a ** 
Outcome 
certainty4
* *** * ** 
Price 
stability 
*** * *** * 
Long term 
stability 
** * *** * 
Flexibility 
for learning3
** *** * ** 
Characteristics as an international instrument 
 Tax 
Varie
d 
Tax 
Harmonise
d 
No or 
Indirec
t 
linkage
4
Inter-
changeabl
e 
Long 
term 
global 
contracts 
International 
offsets 
(CDM/JI) 
Ease of 
extending 
jurisdictions 
** * *** ** * *** 
Global 
single-
period 
efficiency 
** *** *(*)5 *** n/a ** 
International 
transfers 
Not intrinsic: 
separate institutions 
would be needed 
Possibl
e 
throug
h 
indirect 
linkage
s 
Intrinsic 
determine
d by 
allocation 
n/a Intrinsic but 
constrained 
by 
additionality 
requirements
6
Notes. 
1. Contracts-for-difference on future prices of carbon and/or (for low carbon sources) 
electricity prices 
2. Quota offsets in which projects earn ‘emission reduction credits’ that can be used in a 
quota scheme to comply with quotas, or (in principle) offset against tax.  Offset schemes in 
principle could also be directly state funded.  
3. Flexibility to adapt over time.  Quota and tax schemes also intrinsically generate different 
kinds of learning: quota schemes reveal the costs of given environmental goals; tax schemes 
in principle generate learning about the abatement response, though this is less easy to 
observe and separate from other factors that price observation in an emissions trading scheme. 
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4. Emissions trading schemes in different countries could be entirely isolated from each 
other, share an agreed platform in terms of contributing to negotiated national targets, or 
linked indirectly through common recognition of some types of international offsets. 
5. Global efficiency depends upon the degree of indirect linkage 
6. Additionality requirements are the requirement to demonstrate that emission credits reflect 
new and additional emission savings 
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